Inequality and Sovereign Default under Democracy by Yong Kyun Kim
Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis, Vol:1, No:1 (2017) 81-115 
 
Page | 81  
 
 
Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis 
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed Scientific Journal 
Printed ISSN: 2521-6627 | Online ISSN: 2521-6619 
Publisher: Tripal Publishing House | DOI:10.1991/jefa.v1i1.a5 
 Journal homepage: www.ojs.tripaledu.com/jefa 
 
Inequality and Sovereign Default under Democracy 
 
Yong Kyun KIM
* 
School of International Studies, University of the Pacific, United States 
 
Abstract 
Do differences in the inequality of income affect the likelihood that democratic 
governments decide not to honor their foreign debt contracts? I argue that 
sovereign default involves an intertemporal tradeoff between an immediate 
consumption boost and a future tax increase. Since a poorer voter internalizes less 
of the future cost of default, as the median is poorer, the majority’s demand for 
default increases. Therefore, greater income inequality implies a higher default 
risk. I then present a signaling game that models strategic selection that a 
sovereign must go through to get to the default decision node. I show that 
sovereign default is most likely to actually occur when the level of income 
inequality is intermediate. The intuition is that sovereign default occurs when risky 
sovereigns successfully induce creditors to provide a loan, but the most risky ones 
are among those least able to do so. Empirical findings support the claim. 
Key Words: Sovereign Debt; Sovereign Default; Democracy; Income Inequality; 
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1. Introduction 
Typically sovereign defaults occur during times of economic trouble, often 
triggered by large exogenous shocks (Tomz and Wright, 2007). However, they are 
more than simply an economic event since honoring debt obligations by a 
borrowing government is often a matter of political will. The literature on 
sovereign debt suggests that defaulting governments have the technical ability to 
repay debts in most cases; what they often seem to lack is the incentive to do so 
(Drazen, 1998; Panizza et al., 2009). What makes governments under economic 
distress more or less willing to repay their foreign debts? In particular, do 
differences in the inequality of income affect the likelihood that democratic 
governments decide not to honor their loan agreement with foreign creditors?  
Political economists have emphasized various perils of “distributional tug-
ofwar” in democracies with extreme income inequality. Inequality and the 
resulting distributive politics hinder economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994), contribute to inflationary crises (Desai et al. 2003; 
Haggard and Kaufman, 1995), and lead to massive capital flight (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1990; Mahon, 1996). The underlying logic of these “populist 
pathologies” is that higher income inequality creates a greater political demand 
for redistributive policies, and opportunistic politicians catering to the (relatively 
poorer) median voter opt for short-sighted, distortionary policies. Similarly and 
with regard to sovereign default, Berg and Sachs (1988, p.271) find that “countries 
with high income inequality had a significant greater likelihood, ceteris paribus, of 
having rescheduled their debts than did countries with low income inequality.”                
Besides Berg and Sachs (1988), however, the literature of sovereign default 
has been silent on income inequality. There are few empirical findings that relate 
the inequality of wealth and income to the propensity of sovereign default.1 Most 
works tend to focus on a number of proximate financial covariates of default 
instead of delving into underlying causes (e.g., Manasse and Roubini, 2009; 
Pescatori and Sy, 2007). As to the political side of the story, the literature also 
tends to scratch the surface. In an attempt to account for political factors, many 
only include in a regression equation “political risk” indices, such as the 
International Country Risk Guides (ICRG) index, without asking why some 
countries are perceived riskier than others (e.g., Gelos et al., 2011; Haque et al., 
2000). In this article, I revive the spirit of Berg and Sachs (1988) in the context of 
democracy and show in a novel way that income inequality indeed is at the root 
of sovereign default under democracy. 
                                                          
1
 A recent, partial exception to this is Giordano and Tommasino (2011). 
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I do so in two steps. First, I argue that sovereign default serves as one form of 
redistributive policies. Default involves an intertemporal tradeoff between an 
immediate public consumption boost and a future tax increase. Since the poorer a 
voter is, the less she internalizes the future efficiency cost of default, the median 
voter is more likely to find such an intertemporal exchange in her favor as she is 
poorer relative to the average voter. The majority’s demand for sovereign default, 
then, is greater as the income distribution becomes more skewed. Hence, the risk 
that a democratic government succumbs to the popular demand for default 
increases with income inequality. 
Second, to derive empirical implications suitable for testing against data, I 
present a simple signaling game that models the strategic interactions between 
creditors and sovereigns. Default cannot be observed when it is believed to occur 
for sure because any rational creditors would not provide a loan in the first place 
to a sovereign who is going to default at any event. Recognizing this, I claim that 
there are two steps of strategic selection that a sovereign must go through to get 
to the point where it actually decides whether or not to default. First, sovereigns 
select themselves into “requesting a loan” by deciding whether or not to send a 
costly signal. Second, on observing the signal, creditors decide whether or not to 
lend to the signal-sending sovereign. 
It turns out that, somewhat counter-intuitively, sovereign default is most 
likely to actually occur when the level of income inequality is intermediate if, in 
fact, higher income inequality implies a greater propensity to default. The 
intuition is that sovereign default occurs when “risky” sovereigns successfully 
induce creditors to provide a loan, but the most risky ones are among those least 
able to do so. In addition, the model also provides a prediction that the likelihood 
that a sovereign is left with no credit monotonically increases with income 
inequality. Statistical analyses of the incidence of sovereign default as well as that 
of zero credit access in a sample of democratic developing countries provide 
strong support for key empirical implications of the model.  
2. Democracy, Inequality, and Default 
Political explanations of sovereign default are closely tied to the “willingness-
to-pay” model. The model rests on two key features that distinguish sovereign 
debt from ordinary one. First, debt repayment is rarely a question of the ability to 
pay. Borrowing countries generally do not default during good times, but with few 
exceptions, they choose not to pay even when the debt obligations are such an 
amount that “could clearly be repaid over the long horizon were there the political 
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will to do so” (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989, p.156). Whether a borrowing government 
defaults or not is, at the margin, a political decision (Drazen, 2002). 
Second, unlike corporate debt contracts, strict means of repayment 
enforcement are typically unavailable for sovereign borrowing. To secure a debt 
obligation in case of private borrowing under domestic law, a lender often 
demands collateral for the loan, the right to which is subject to seizure by the 
lender in the event of default. When the borrower is the sovereign, however, 
collateral is largely irrelevant. Debtor assets that could be seized by the lender are 
worth only a small fraction of outstanding debt (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989), and 
creditors cannot possibly obtain the right to assets within the debtor country 
(Panizza et al. 2009). Without a world government, sovereign debt contracts are 
far from enforceable (Tomz, 2007). 
Why then do borrowing governments make repayments on their foreign debt 
at all? To induce them to repay, lenders or any third parties must have some 
penalty devices with which to raise the cost of default high enough to outweigh its 
benefit. To enforce debt payment, lenders used to resort to “gunboat diplomacy” 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2010). Since 
World War II, lenders have organized trade sanctions on a defaulter (Rose, 2005), 
and have conditioned their future lending decision on a sovereign’s track record 
of repayments (Tomz, 2007). 
Consider the following simplified version of the willingness-to-pay model 
(Schultz and Weingast, 2003). Suppose that a sovereign seeks a loan of value L at 
an interest rate i, and that the lenders can impose a penalty P in the event of 
default. Then, when it comes due, the sovereign must choose to repay the lenders 
L(1 + i) or default and suffer the penalty P. It will honor the debt obligation if the 
cost of default P is greater than its benefit, the windfall gain from its total 
outstanding debt L(1 + i): 
𝐿 1 +  𝑖 <  𝑃                                                                                                             (1) 
In other words, the sovereign is willing to pay if the inequality above holds. 
How does domestic politics under democracy shape a sovereign’s willingness 
to pay? Democratic institutions might make the sovereign willing to pay by raising 
the value of “political penalties” in the event of default (Schultz and Weingast, 
2003). Voters may share an interest with sovereign debt-holders in various ways. 
They themselves may be debt-holders; they may have a great stake in trade or 
financial sectors whose interests will be harmed by the backlash of sovereign 
default (Alesina, 1988; Alesina et al., 1992); or they may be inclined to punish the 
government for reneging on international agreements (Tomz, 2005a). In short, 
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high political costs of default for democratic governments might effectively 
discourage the incumbent politicians from reneging on their debt contracts.  
The power of the public, however, can be, and is often, seen as a source of 
political risks (Desai et al., 2003). Democratic competition and mass mobilization 
may exacerbate untempered popular demands for distortionary public policy such 
as inflationary public spending. Politicians in democracy are vulnerable to popular 
pressure for current consumption, and hence, behave opportunistically by 
manipulating fiscal and monetary policy to appease voters (Alesina et al., 1997). In 
the mean time, a government’s credibility to long-term commitments is often 
compromised, and sub-optimal outcomes such as macroeconomic instability 
ensue. Moreover, elected “populist” leaders might be induced to confiscate the 
assets of the unpopular “oligarchs” or those of foreigners to maximize their 
chances for reelection (Clague et al., 1996). 
Given the fact that in a typical developing country, prominent lenders are 
foreigners who lack political power, it cannot be taken for granted that 
democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from committing to 
repaying vast outstanding debt at all costs (Saiegh, 2005). Indeed, there is no 
shortage of examples in history of sovereign default that opportunistic politicians 
catering to the public’s strong aversion to staggering debt burden opted for 
declaring a heroic default on foreign debt (Tomz, 2005a, 2007). Peru’s Alan García 
is probably the best-known example. During his first presidency in the mid 1980s, 
he unilaterally declared that he would pay no more than 10 percent of the 
country’s export earnings, which became known as the “10 percent solution,” a 
very confrontational, yet highly popular debt bargaining position (Aggarwal, 1996, 
pp.393-399). Similarly, Argentina eventually defaulted on about $100 billion 
foreign debt in the last week of 2001 while angry citizens took the streets 
shouting, “Don’t pay the foreign debt.” A leading populist candidate in the 
previous presidential election held in 1999, Eduardo Duhalde, had called for a 
suspension of debt payments as his campaign platform (Tomz, 2005b). More 
recently, Rafael Correa, president of Ecuador and well known for his populist 
stance, said in 2006 at a news conference with Venezuelan president Hugo 
Chavez, “If our moral duty to provide health, education and housing to our people 
impedes us from paying debt, we won’t hesitate two seconds *to default+” 
(Kennedy and Bradley, 2006). Later he made good on his promise when he 
declared a suspension of interest payments on the country’s bonded debt in 2008, 
triggering one of the most recent sovereign defaults. A sovereign default can be 
politically rewarding for reelection-seeking politicians, especially during hard 
times. 
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What motivate elected politicians are reward and punishment at the polls. 
They should opt to default if doing so rewards them with reelection, and they 
should continue to pay in full if voters punish them for failing to do so. The 
majority’s preference over sovereign default is, therefore, crucial in shaping a 
democratic government’s willingness to pay. I argue that the majority’s 
preference over default, in turn, is largely determined by distribution of income. 
The issue of sovereign default maps well into the rich-poor dimension 
because it implies an increase in public consumption financed by a future tax 
increase. To see why, note first that sovereign default involves both immediate 
windfall gains and considerable long-run costs. Failure to pay the total 
outstanding debt in full would bring the government lump-sum revenue that 
substitutes for the need to raise taxes or reduce spending (Alesina et al., 1992). 
The mean total external debt as a percentage of GDP is about 70% for all 
developing nations, and when they pay, they spend on average about 18% of their 
total earnings from exports for debt payments. For many highly indebted 
countries, the total external debt easily amounts to 200% or even to 300% of GDP. 
It is not uncommon that the total debt service exceeds 30% of export earnings 
(World Bank, 2005). A default on outstanding debt would then generate instant 
revenue that amounts to 18% of export value at a minimum. 
Sovereign default, on the other hand, is costly in the medium and long term. 
It is hard to estimate the effects of default on the economy as a whole because 
when a government defaults, usually situations are already in bad shape. 
However, a number of studies have suggested that a defaulting economy suffers 
overall output losses over the long run (Cohen, 1992; De Paoli et al., 2006; Dooley, 
2000). In particular, it inflicts high costs on the defaulters in the future credit 
markets. Defaulting governments lose reputation, if they had any, and will have 
difficulty borrowing in the future (Borensztein and Panizza, 2009). Their credit 
ratings will plunge in the event of default; so will their bonds prices, and the 
interest rates at which they can borrow will triple. As a result, they end up having 
to pay more for a dollar they borrow in the future than they would otherwise 
have had to. 
Borrowing is an intertemporal tax smoothing instrument: Spending today 
with a loan and paying tomorrow (Barro, 1979). Default is just another mechanism 
for intertemporal tax smoothing at the payment due date: Spending now again 
instead of repaying the debt and paying still later (Cohen, 1982). Just like 
borrowing implies a future tax to repay the debt, default implies a higher future 
tax to pay the borrowing costs that are increased due to the default. Hence, 
voters’ preferences over default are parallel to those over borrowing, which in 
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turn boil down to the preferences over future tax rates. When considering 
default, voters must weigh the marginal current consumption benefit against the 
future deadweight loss due to higher tax rates.  
As in the standard models of income taxation, it follows that the median 
income voter is more likely to prefer default to repayment as its income is farther 
away from the average income level (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000). This is because the poorer a voter is, the less she internalizes the 
future efficiency cost of a higher tax to which she contributes only proportional to 
her income while enjoying the same unit of public consumption today. As 
Hatchondo and Martinez (2010, pp.296-297) succinctly put, “a default is likely to 
be prevented as long as wealthier… citizens impose their will.” Hence, as an 
increase in inequality implies that the gap between the median and the mean 
income levels is wider, the public demand for sovereign default should be greater 
with higher income inequality, making its government more prone to default.2 
There are two other reasons why the poor are more likely to prefer default 
than the rich. 3  First, the poor benefit more from the increased current 
consumption than the rich. The immediate benefits of default, in practice, are 
often realized as waived costs of fiscal adjustment because default is considered 
as an option during bad times when there is no means other than drastic fiscal 
retrenchment to continue to repay the rapidly swelling outstanding debts 
(Haggard and Kaufman, 1989). By deciding not to pay in full, the defaulting 
government could avoid costly austerity measures and honor its “social contracts” 
by keeping up the public spending pattern. The costs of fiscal adjustment fall 
disproportionately on the poor. Drastic government budget cuts harm those who 
are on public payrolls and hurt unemployed and poor citizens who rely heavily on 
public transfers and services (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Nelson, 1990). 
Empirical studies of the effect of IMF stabilization programs have shown that they 
tended to further impoverish low-income families and reduce the labor’s share of 
income (Pastor, 1987; Vreeland, 2002, 2003). Hence, with such costs waived, 
default benefits the poor more than the rich.4 
Second, the poor tend to discount the future more heavily than the rich do. 
The rich, by definition, are endowed with more assets that generate future 
                                                          
2
 In a similar vein, Karayalçin and McCollister (2004) argue that inequality leads to popular 
pressures on the government to use foreign debt to finance a redistribution of income. 
3
 These two additional reasons the assumptions implicitly made above that government 
consumption is distributed equally and tax rates are proportional to income. 
4
 Consistent with this argument, a survey conducted in Argentina, 2002, has shown that 
low-income people tended to prefer a suspension of debt payment (Tomz, 2005b). 
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income streams such as land, financial assets, and human capital. As Alichi (2008, 
p.4) argues, “Different individuals have different attitudes to their country’s 
reputation in capital markets. Some care more than others about access to them 
as insurance against future bad shocks to the economy.” Possessing these assets 
that promise future income streams makes the rich value more highly the future 
and more susceptible to the reputational costs caused by default. Hence, the 
perceived burden of future taxes is disproportionately higher on the rich.  
In short, sovereign default implies an intertemporal tradeoff: An immediate 
public consumption financed by a future tax that is higher than it would otherwise 
have been, the overall effects of which are distributional from the rich to the 
poor. Since the majority’s demand for such an intertemporal exchange is greater 
as the income distribution becomes more skewed, the risk that a democratic 
government succumbs to the popular demand for default increases with the 
income inequality. 
3. Modeling Strategic Selection 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that the level of income 
equality is one of the observable characteristics of the borrowing country from 
which creditors can infer its willingness to pay. Creditors then can project the 
propensity to default of a given country based on its equality-related willingness 
to pay as shown in Figure 1. As greater willingness to pay, by definition, implies a 
less propensity to default, the probability of default should be monotonically 
decreasing with the level of income equality. 
 
Figure 1. The Propensity to Sovereign Default 
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If this is true, however, can one observe this pattern in data on sovereign 
default? Consider a sovereign located in the far left of Figure 1. It is characterized 
by extreme income inequality, hence almost certain to default ex ante: Its 
probability to default is close to one. Why would then any rational creditors lend 
to the sovereign in the first place? In fact, the willingness-to-pay model of 
sovereign default suggests that no credit is provided more than a sovereign is 
believed to be willing to repay. If a sovereign prefers not to repay (i.e., L(1 + i) > 
P), it has no incentive to honor its promise to repay. If it has no incentive to carry 
out that promise, its promise is not credible, and no rational creditor would 
extend a loan in the first place. If the sovereign is denied access to credit, then it 
cannot actually default because it would not have a loan to default on. Therefore, 
one should not observe in sovereign default data such a monotonic relationship 
between observable characteristics of willingness to pay and the likelihood of 
actual default. 
To predict what pattern is expected to emerge instead, I model strategic 
interactions between a sovereign and a bank as a signaling game with two-sided 
incomplete information (see Figure 2).5 In the model, the sovereign is always 
seeking a loan; in other words, a loan is a good even though it needs to repay. Its 
preference over default depends on its type. It prefers to repay if it is willing to 
pay, that is, if its payoff to repaying exceeds that to defaulting. The sovereign’s 
decision on whether or not to default, however, can be made only when the bank 
has lent it a loan. The bank prefers to lend than to reject a loan request provided 
the loan is to be repaid, and it least prefers to extend a loan that will not be paid 
back. The bank must decide whether or not to lend upon the sovereign’s request 
with a signal, and it does so by carefully investigating the sovereign’s willingness 
to pay as well as its ability to do so. If the sovereign chooses not to request a loan, 
the status quo prevails. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Aggarwal (1996) develops game-theoretic models of debt renegotiations to predict 
outcomes of debt rescheduling with an assumption that both sides know each other’s 
payoffs. Tomz (2007), assuming incomplete information, develops his reputational theory 
of sovereign debt to explain how a borrower’s reputation forms and how reputation 
affects its incentive to repay. My goal is related but simpler: to derive predictions on how 
borrower’s observable characteristics affect lending and default decisions. 
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 Figure 2. The Sovereign Default Game with Incomplete Information 
The bank faces uncertainty regarding the sovereign’s type: the bank is not 
sure how willing the sovereign is to pay.6 Specifically, the bank knows only the 
probability distributions of the sovereign’s payoffs to paying (p ~ N(π, ς2))and to 
defaulting (d ~ N(δ, ς2)), but not what their true values are. So the bank is, say, 
about 95 percent sure that the sovereign’s true payoff to paying is in the range (π 
− 2ς, π + 2ς), but not sure exactly where it is. It forms this prior belief, the mean 
values π and δ, in particular, from the sovereign’s observable characteristics such 
as income inequality. On its part, the sovereign is also uncertain about the bank’s 
payoff to loan rejection (R ~ N(ρ, ς2)). 
The uncertainty faced by the bank gives the sovereign an incentive to 
represent or misrepresent its type. A sovereign of a willing-to-pay type should 
want the bank to know for sure that it is of a good type, and hence, has the 
incentive to send such a signal to the bank. A sovereign of an unwilling-to-pay 
type, on the other hand, might want to mimic the behavior of the good-type 
sovereign by sending the same signal, an attempt to mislead the bank to believe 
that it is of a good type as well. To the extent that any unwilling-to-pay types send 
the same signal, the signal does not carry any information. Then it is mere “cheap 
talk.” 
                                                          
6
 It is true that creditors know, to some extent, which countries are “risky” and which ones 
are “safe.” There is a great deal of information on country risk that is publicly available. 
Creditors also have good reason to collect every piece of information on potential 
borrowers lest they incur a loss from default. However, it is also true that there always 
exists some degree of uncertainty in the real world, and this inherent uncertainty explains 
in part why in reality some creditors “wrongly” lent to a sovereign, which then defaulted. 
The assumption that creditors face uncertainty regarding how risky or safe the potential 
borrowing countries are, is innocuous, and perhaps, more realistic. 
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For a signal to be at least partially informative, it must be costly enough to be 
unaffordable to some bad types. There are a number of policy tools that 
governments have used as a costly signal: Signing an agreement with the IMF 
(Edwards, 2006), liberalizing the capital account (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997), 
signing international trade agreements or investment treaties (Elkins et al., 2006), 
granting the central bank independence (Pastor and Maxfield, 1999), fixing the 
exchange rate to an anchor currency (Bernhard and Leblang, 1999; Broz, 2002), 
adopting inflation targeting policy, appointing a high-profile businessperson to the 
ministry of finance, and the like. These are policy tools at a government’s disposal, 
and are used implicitly or explicitly to enhance the government’s credibility in the 
eyes of international creditors and investors. What makes them a signal to the 
market is the “sovereignty cost” that they involve. By entering into an explicit 
international agreement or abandoning its policy autonomy, the government 
loses a great deal of policy-making authority that it could use to serve its interests 
otherwise. The fact that it has paid such an opportunity cost signals its 
commitment to behaving well in the global markets (Elkins et al., 2006; Vreeland, 
2003). 
In the model, if the sovereign sends a signal to request a loan, but fails to 
induce the bank to lend, then it is left strictly worse off since it has only incurred 
the cost of the signal (c > 0). As such, the sovereign can be deterred from 
requesting a loan with a costly signal if its status quo payoff exceeds the expected 
payoff to signaling, which depends on the bank’s lending probability (pL), a 
probability that the bank will lend to the sovereign on observing that the 
sovereign has sent a costly signal. In other words, the sovereign pays the cost of 
sending a signal if q < (1 − pL)(q − c) + pLmax(p, d). 
The bank, on the other hand, makes its lending decision upon the sovereign’s 
request by weighing its payoff to rejection against the lottery payoff from lending 
to a potentially risky sovereign, which depends on the bank’s posterior belief 
about the sovereign’s willingness to pay, or its default probability (pD), a 
probability that the sovereign will default if a loan is provided given that it has 
sent a signal. That is, the bank lends to the sovereign if R < (1 − pD )P + pDD. While 
the sovereign does not know what R is, it nonetheless knows the probability that 
this inequality holds, or pL, and as explained, conditions its choice of signaling on 
this probability. 
Since a higher pD implies a lower pL, the sovereign’s signaling probability (pS), 
a probability that the sovereign sends a signal should also decrease with pD. On 
the other hand, pD, the conditional probability that the sovereign will default 
given that it has sent a signal, is proportional to the joint probability that it prefers 
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to default (p < d) and it prefers to pay the signaling cost (max(p, d) > q + 
c(1−pL)/pL). Given pL, this joint probability is higher if the difference in the mean 
payoffs, (π − δ), is farther below from zero. In words, the posterior probability that 
the signal-sending sovereign will default is higher if its observables suggest a priori 
that it is of a highly risky type. Then, a sovereign with a higher prior probability to 
default will have a lower probability of the bank’s lending, and hence, will send a 
signal with a lower probability in the first place. 
This is the logic behind the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game.7 
Formally, given its posterior belief pD, the bank lends to the sovereign if 
𝑅 <  1 − 𝑝𝐷 𝑃 + 𝑝𝐷𝐷                                                                                              (2) 
Since R is normally distributed, the probability that this inequality holds is 
𝑝𝐿 = Φ 𝑝𝐷𝐷 +  1 − 𝑝𝐷 𝑃 − 𝑝                                                                             (3) 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (normalizing ς 
equal to one). 
Given its belief about the bank’s strategy, pL, in equilibrium, the sovereign 
signals if 
𝑞 <  1 − 𝑝𝐿 (𝑞 − 𝑐) + 𝑝𝐿max⁡(𝑝, 𝑑)                                                                    (4) 
or 
max 𝑝, 𝑑 < 𝑞 + 𝑐 1 − 𝑝𝐿 /𝑝𝐿                                                                                (5) 
The probability that the sovereign signals is 
𝑝𝑆 < 1 − Φ 𝑞
∗ − 𝜋 Φ 𝑞∗ − 𝛿                                                                               (6) 
where 𝑞∗ = 𝑞 + 𝑐 1 − 𝑝𝐿 /𝑝𝐿. 
The conditional probability that the sovereign will default given that it has 
sent a signal is 
𝑝𝐷 = Prob 𝑝 < 𝑑 ∩ max 𝑝, 𝑑 >  𝑞
∗ /𝑝𝑆                                                           (7) 
or 
𝑝𝐷 = Prob 𝑝 < 𝑑 ∩ 𝑑 >  𝑞
∗ /𝑝𝑆                                                                           (8) 
With these equilibrium strategies, it is now possible to calculate each of the 
four outcome probabilities of the game, the status quo (SQ), signaling and 
                                                          
7
 The following formalization is drawn from Lewis and Schultz (2003). 
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rejecting (RJ), lending and repaying (LR), and lending and defaulting (LD) as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑆𝑄 = 1 − 𝑝𝑆                                                                                                    (9) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑅𝐽 = 𝑝𝑆(1 − 𝑝𝐿)                                                                                         (10) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐿𝑅 = 𝑝𝑆𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝑝𝐷)                                                                                    (11) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐿𝐷 = 𝑝𝑆𝑝𝐿𝑝𝐷                                                                                                (12) 
These are the probabilities that each outcome is observed in equilibrium. 
One expects to observe, for instance, LD, the outcome of lending and default, 
with a probability pSpLpD. Note that the solution to the three equilibrium 
probabilities, pS, pL, and pD, is not of a closed form: One solution is a function of 
the others. I thus performed simulations to solve this system of equations 
numerically. First I normalized the distributions of the three random payoffs (p, d, 
and R) to the standard normal distribution. Then I assigned values to other fixed 
payoffs in such a way that is compatible with the payoff structure of the game. 
Specifically, I set P to 3 and D to -3 for the bank, and q to (min(π, δ) − 3) and c to 
0.5 for the sovereign. With this particular set of payoffs, the solution is the 
following: pS = 0.54, pL = 0.72, and pD = 0.30. This solution is, in turn, translated 
into the four outcome probabilities as follows: Prob(SQ) = 0.46, Prob(RJ) = 0.15, 
Prob(LR) = 0.27, and Prob(LD) = 0.12. Thus, with the sovereign’s mean payoffs to 
repayment and to default both set to zero, the probability that its default is 
actually observed is about 0.12. 
As noted above, these outcome probabilities change as the sovereign’s mean 
payoffs change. To see how those probabilities vary as a function of the 
sovereign’s willingness to pay, I varied the mean of p from -4 to 4 while holding 
the others constant. The resulting comparative statics then should provide 
predictions about the outcomes of the game as a function of the mean value of 
willingness to pay, or the relative size of the mean payoff to repaying given the 
mean payoff to defaulting. 
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3. The top-left panel is the 
probability of the status quo. It displays how the first step of strategic selection 
occurs. It shows that the probability of self-screening decreases monotonically 
with the sovereign’s mean willingness to pay. That is, the more willing-to-pay the 
sovereign is expected to be, the more likely it is to send a costly signal. 
Conversely, those sovereigns characterized by riskier factors to begin with are 
more likely to be deterred from sending a costly signal in the first place, hence to 
be left with no credit. 
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Figure 3. The Four Equilibrium Outcome Probabilities 
The top-right panel describes the probability of rejecting a loan request. This 
regards the outcome of the second step of the strategic selection. It increases first 
and then declines as the sovereign’s mean willingness to pay increases. It goes up 
first because while the sovereign with a high-risk profile is increasingly more likely 
to request a loan by sending a signal, the bank tries to remain cautious in 
increasing its lending probability. It is not until there is a greater chance that the 
signal sender is in fact of a good type that this probability starts to decline. 
At the bottom-left the probability that a sovereign debt repayment occurs is 
shown. It increases monotonically, but kicks in only after some point. No 
repayment is expected to be made by a high-risk profile sovereign because it is 
unlikely to signal in the first place, and even if it did, its request is likely to be 
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rejected by the bank, and finally, even if it successfully induced the bank to lend, it 
is likely to be in fact of a risky type, hence no repayment. It increases with the 
mean willingness to pay because the sovereign is increasingly more likely to 
signal, more likely to get a loan, and more likely to repay as its risk profile 
improves. 
Finally, the bottom-right panel displays the probability that a sovereign 
default occurs, the outcome of primary interest. A central feature of the pattern 
here is the non-monotonic relationship between the sovereign’s mean willingness 
to pay and the probability of a default outcome. A sovereign with very low mean 
willingness to pay such as a democracy with extreme income inequality is very 
unlikely to actually default because it is very unlikely to send a costly signal in the 
first place. As the mean willingness to pay increases, it is more likely to request a 
loan expecting a higher lending probability. Yet there is a higher chance that the 
sovereign in fact prefers to default until the mean willingness to pay turns 
positive. Thus, the default probability goes up first. However, it then declines as 
the sovereign is increasingly more likely to be of a good type. 
Note that as the mean willingness to pay approaches the center of the 
distribution where the bank believes with about a 50-50 chance that the 
sovereign is willing to pay, the uncertainty on the bank’s part is the greatest. Here, 
the probability that a default occurs is the highest because the unwilling-to-pay 
type is most likely to succeed in inducing the bank to provide a loan. This makes 
sense intuitively. Sovereign defaults occur when “risky” sovereigns successfully 
induce creditors to lend, but the most risky ones are those who are 
unambiguously risky to the creditors, and hence are among those least able to 
mislead the creditors. Somewhat risky sovereigns, in contrast, are those who pose 
the greatest uncertainty to the creditors, and hence, are most likely to lead the 
creditors to “wrongly” extend a loan. 
There is a good deal of impressionistic evidence that is supportive of this 
claim. Argentina is a country with relatively moderate income inequality with an 
average Gini of 46.3 and one of the few countries that have enjoyed consistent 
access to credit market. Yet it has defaulted more than two times as often as 
others have. Its neighboring Paraguay, on the other hand, is characterized by 
more extreme inequality with an average Gini of 55.0 and has suffered from 
consistent lack of access to private credit presumably due to the lack of credibility. 
Not surprisingly, Paraguay has not defaulted once. Still another neighbor, 
Uruguay, has a relatively equal income distribution with an average Gini of 42.9, 
by Latin American standards, and has had quite consistent access to private 
capital, and yet never defaulted at least until 2003. A similar triplet can be found 
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in sub-Saharan Africa. Madagascar with moderate income inequality with an 
average Gini of 50.2 has been one of the few countries in the region that have 
occasionally had access to private capital, and yet has frequently defaulted about 
three times more often than average countries have. The Gambia, a country with 
extreme inequality with an average Gini of 71.0, has never had access to credit, 
and has never defaulted. Mauritius, on the other hand, has a relatively equal 
income distribution with an average Gini of 39.1, and has frequently had access to 
credit, but has not defaulted yet.8 
In short, sovereign default is most likely to be observed when the mean 
willingness to pay of a sovereign is at the intermediate level. That is, both highly 
unequal and highly equal democracies are less likely to actually default than 
democracies with moderate income inequality. While highly equal democracies 
prefer not to default, highly unequal ones cannot secure a loan to default on. This 
is the central prediction of the model, and I now turn to statistical analysis to test 
this hypothesis. 
4. Data and Analysis 
I test the central prediction of the model as depicted at the bottom-right 
panel of Figure 3 by examining the impact of income inequality on the probability 
of default occurrence in 48 developing democracies between 1970 and 2009.9 
Data on default and other debt indicators are all from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance (GDF). Data on economic controls are from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). I treat a country-year as democracy 
if its Polity2 score in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010) is zero or 
higher. For a robustness check, however, I also employ +6 as well as -6 for the 
cutoff points. My sample includes all cases for which complete data were 
available. A full list of countries and years is provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The information on countries’ market access history is from Gelos et al. (2011). They 
construct the data from Capital Data (Bondware and Loanware), which is not publicly 
available. 
9
 Ideally, one could estimate the effect of income inequality on default using a two-stage 
selection model, in which the access to credit is directly modeled as the selection process. 
This, however, requires data on sovereign debts contract-by-contract. Without such data, 
no options seem feasible other than shooting for the pattern that should emerge from the 
selection. 
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4.1. Dependent Variable: Default 
To determine when a sovereign defaulted, I employ a definition of sovereign 
default commonly used by economists (e.g., Reinhart et al., 2003): Default occurs 
when a country fails to meet principal or interest payment on the due date or 
when it restructures its external debt. This definition of sovereign default is also 
largely consistent with the criteria that leading rating agencies employ to define 
default. Moody’s Investors Service (1999), for instance, defines default as “(1) any 
missed or delayed payment of interest and/or principal or (2) any exchange where 
the debtor offers the creditor a new contract that amounts to a diminished 
financial obligation or (3) where the exchange has the apparent purpose of 
helping the borrower avoid default.” In short, the accumulation of debt payment 
arrears and a rescheduling arrangement are the two indicators of whether a 
sovereign defaults or not. 
More precisely, Default4050, the dependent variable, takes one if the 
increase in the stock of total arrears exceeds 4 percent of total debt from private 
creditors10 or if the total amount of debt rescheduled exceeds 5 percent of total 
debt from private creditors unless the stock of total arrears decreases by more 
than the amount of debt rescheduled in the same year, and zero otherwise.11 To 
make sure that results are not driven by a particular choice of default thresholds, I 
employ two additional thresholds. Default2025 has thresholds of 2 percent for 
arrears and 2.5 percent for rescheduled debt, and Default6075 has 6 percent and 
7.5 percent for each. In the sample, about 25.4 percent of country-years are 
coded as default for Default4050. The corresponding numbers are 31.0 percent 
and 20.5 percent for Default2025 and Default6075, respectively. 
4.2. Independent Variable: Equality 
To facilitate interpretation, I use, as a measure of an income distribution, 
Equality, which is simply calculated as (100 - Gini index). It represents, according 
to my theory, a sovereign’s mean willingness to pay, or one key factor from which 
potential creditors infer a sovereign’s willingness to pay. To fit the inverted-U 
                                                          
10
 I focus on default on private debt (from commercial banks and bonds) as opposed to 
official debt because official creditors such as international financial institutions might not 
act as a pure creditor seeking profits from lending business and might be affected by some 
‘political’ considerations (Stone, 2004). 
11
 Note that the threshold is applied to a change of arrears. As Peter (2002) suggests, this 
flow-based operationalization better captures yearly variations in debt repayment 
behaviors. A new default occurs whenever there is a large (four percent or greater) 
increase in arrears. 
Y.K. Kim / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 81-115 
 
Page | 98  
 
shaped relationship, I include its square term, Equality2, the coefficient on which 
should be significantly smaller than zero if the results are to be supportive of my 
prediction. 
The Gini index of income inequality is taken from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID). The database standardizes the United 
Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database (WIID) using as the 
standard the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data to maximize comparability for 
the largest possible sample of countries and years (Solt, 2009). It provides Gini 
indices of both gross and net income inequality for 153 countries. I use gross 
income Gini to capture the degree of potential demands for income redistribution 
in a country. The sample mean of Gini index is 47.7 while the minimum is 24.1 and 
the maximum is 77.3. 
4.3. Control Variables 
In addition to income inequality, I include a host of control variables. First, 
the level of indebtedness (Total debt), measured as the ratio of total outstanding 
external debt to GDP, may be an indication of how willing a sovereign is to pay. 
Many heavily indebted countries borrowed foreign debts mostly by way of 
bilateral or multilateral official lending and accumulated them over time. Heavy 
indebtedness is indeed a sign of the lack of willingness as well as the inability to 
pay (Easterly, 2002). 
Second, economic development, measured by GDP per capita, may affect a 
sovereign’s willingness to pay just like how income distribution affects it. As a 
country becomes richer, the majority may prefer not to incur long-run costs of 
default than to boost immediate consumption. Third, greater trade openness 
(Trade) may also make a sovereign more willing to pay (Lane, 1999; Rose and 
Spiegel, 2004). In the event of default, creditors might block trade-related short-
term credit and even impose trade embargoes. Hence, the more trade-dependent 
a country is, the higher the costs of default might be.12 I also include a measure of 
political competitiveness, Democracy, to see if there is any “democraticness” 
effect on default among democracies. The more democratic a democracy is, the 
less likely it might commit a default. 
                                                          
12
 The relationship between trade and default is subject to a debate, however. For 
instance, Tomz (2007) argues that trade sanctions are not an effective punishment tool 
because they require all major trade partners of a defaulting country to co-operate in 
forgoing profits from trade. 
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I include several standard liquidity indicators for controls as well. GDP growth 
is included to control for business cycle that might affect the sovereign’s ability to 
pay. The ratio of short-term debt to reserves (Short-term debt) and the amount of 
international reserves (Reserves) are included as indicators of potential debt 
servicing difficulties in the short run (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; 
Edwards, 1984). The U.S. interest rate (US interest rate) is added as a proxy for 
global liquidity.13 The summary statistics of the variables used in this analysis is 
provided in Appendix B. 
 5. Results 
I estimate the effect of income inequality on the incidence of sovereign 
default using logistic regression. The regression results are reported in Table 1. 
Model 1 tests a model of Default4050 using fixed-effects while Model 2 uses 
random-effects. I performed Hausman tests, and its results indicate that fixed-
effects models should be used. On the other hand, fixed-effects in a logistic model 
may suffer from a sample selection bias as cases with no varying dependent 
variable are deleted from the sample. The results from both methods, however, 
look very similar across the board, assuring that the sample using fixed-effects 
models does not systematically differ from that using random-effects models. 
Throughout the models, the controls also generally have the expected signs 
when they carry some significance. Not surprisingly, the level of outstanding 
external debt scaled by GDP is associated with a greater probability of default. 
GDP per capita turns out to be highly significant suggesting that a richer 
developing country has a greater incentive to pay back its debt on time than a 
poorer one. More reserves, an indication of a greater ability to pay, often mean a 
less likelihood of default while more short-term debt tends to put a greater strain 
on a country’s balance of payments during a debt crisis. When the credit is tight in 
the global North, measured by the U.S. interest rate, developing countries likely 
have harder time avoiding sovereign default.    
 
 
                                                          
13
 I checked multicollinearity of the models by calculating variance influence factors (VIFs). 
The mean VIFs are around 3 indicating the absence of the problem. To the extent that the 
variables are collinear, the main source of the problem is Democracy, whose VIF is quite 
high around 9. Running regressions omitting Democracy reduces VIFs further down to 2 
without causing changes to the main findings. 
Y.K. Kim / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 81-115 
 
Page | 100  
 
Table 1. Income equality and the incidence of sovereign default 
 
(1) 
Fixed-effects 
(2) 
Random-effects 
Democracy 
0.1200* 
(0.0600) 
0.0800 
(0.0600) 
Equality 
0.0300 
(0.0300) 
0.0400** 
(0.0200) 
Equality2 
-0.0040** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0015) 
Total Debt 
0.5000* 
(0.2900) 
0.4300* 
(0.2400) 
GDP per capita 
-1.3000*** 
(0.4300) 
-5.2000*** 
(0.1800) 
Trade 
0.0020 
(0.0070) 
-0.0050 
(0.0050) 
GDP growth 
0.0030 
(0.020) 
-0.0050 
(0.0200) 
Reserves 
-0.0500** 
(0.0200) 
-0.0300* 
(0.0200) 
Short-term debt 
0.5400 
(0.6400) 
1.3000* 
(0.6800) 
US interest rate 
0.1000* 
(0.0500) 
0.1100* 
(0.0400) 
Eastern Europe  
1.8400** 
(0.9400) 
Latin America  
2.0700** 
(0.9500) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
1.2600 
(0.8800) 
South Asia  
-1.5000 
(1.2400) 
Constant  
-3.6000*** 
(1.0000) 
Observations 804 1198 
Countries 48 79 
Notes: Logistic regressions. The White standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.  
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Trade and GDP growth, however, do not seem to matter much in the 
likelihood of default. Democracy, on the other hand, tends to be positively related 
with default to the extent that it is significant. Perhaps, greater electoral 
competition, political participation, and checks and balances, by making the 
government more transparent in its ability to pay, may enable the government to 
default without suffering as much reputational costs as less democratic, less 
transparent governments have to (Kim and O’Neill, forthcoming).14  
Regarding the variables of “willingness-to-pay”, the results for Equality are 
consistent throughout the regressions. As expected, the coefficient for its square 
term is negative and highly significant, indicating that its relationship to the 
probability of default is of an inverted U-shape. Figure 4 depicts the predicted 
probability of fault as a function of Equality holding all others at their means 
based on regression 1. 
As shown, the predicted pattern from the theoretical model is nicely 
recovered in the empirical model. Democracies with the intermediate level of 
income inequality have a substantially higher chance to default than those with 
extreme inequality and those with a relatively equal income distribution. The 
expected probability, when Equality is around 42 (or a Gini index of 58), just 
below the mean, is about 0.20, or 20 percent of the time. It deceases substantially 
as Equality moves in either direction. If Equality is down one standard deviation 
below the mean (35 or a Gini index of 65), the probability of default is predicted 
to decrease to 0.17, or 17 percent of the time. With Equality down further to two 
standard deviations below the mean, the probability of default goes down to 0.05, 
a 75.0 percent decline. The same is true when Equality moves in the other 
direction. If it increases by one standard deviation (55 or a Gini index of 45), the 
predicted probability goes down to 0.1, or 10 percent of the time, and with the 
two standard deviation increase in Equality, the probability decreases to 0.03, a 
significant reduction.  
                                                          
14
 I also included additional controls. One might argue that a government’s ideology 
matters in that governments of the left tend to be nationalist and populist with regard to 
foreign capital and, therefore, are more likely to default on foreign debt. Thus, I added 
dummies for Right and Center governments using a governing party’s ideology measure, 
taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; Beck et al., 2001). Both of the 
coefficients were negative suggesting that governments of the Center and Right are less 
likely to default than those of the Left. But they were not significant throughout the 
models. I also added the log of GDP to account for the size of an economy, the terms of 
trade variable to account for the size of exogenous shocks, and the ratio of interest 
payments to exports. The main results were not affected by these additional controls. 
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Figure 4. The Predicted Probability of Sovereign Default  
To check the robustness of the results, I estimate models with lower and 
higher cutoff points for democracy. As shown in Table 2, the results are consistent 
across models. The coefficient on Equality2 remains correctly signed and 
significant at the 0.05 significance level in Models 3 and 4. This consistency across 
different thresholds both for democracy and default lends further confidence to 
the main empirical findings about the relationship between income inequality and 
sovereign default. Models 5 and 6 employ less and more stringent definitions of 
default, Default2025 and Default6075. The results fall short of the conventional 
level of significance, yet its sign and magnitude remain nearly identical.15 
 
 
                                                          
15
 I also performed a full-out Leamer-type specification test using rcheck command in 
Stata 12 to see how sensitive the main results are to additions and omissions of the 
variables in the right-hand side of the equation. Of all possible permutations, the 
coefficient for Equality2 is negative 100 percent of the time, and significantly so at the 
0.05 level about 61 percent of the time, indicating that the main results are quite robust 
to different specifications. 
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Table 2. Robustness checks 
 
(3) 
Polity2 ≥ -6 
(4) 
Polity2 ≥ 6 
(5) 
Default2025 
(6) 
Default6075 
Democracy 
0.0200 
(0.0200) 
0.2700 
(0.1600) 
0.0900 
(0.0600) 
0.1300* 
(0.0700) 
Equality 
0.0300 
(0.0200) 
0.0300 
(0.0300) 
0.0400 
(0.0300) 
0.0200 
(0.0300) 
Equality2 
-0.0030** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0050** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0030 
(0.0020) 
Total Debt 
0.7000*** 
(0.2400) 
0.6300* 
(0.3400) 
0.8100*** 
(0.3000) 
0.6900* 
(0.3900) 
GDP per capita 
-1.1000*** 
(0.3600) 
-1.2000*** 
(0.4300) 
-1.2000*** 
(0.3600) 
-1.6000*** 
(0.3900) 
Trade 
-0.0020 
(0.0060) 
0.0060 
(0.0080) 
-0.0010 
(0.0070) 
0.0050 
(0.0080) 
GDP growth 
-0.0090 
(0.0100) 
-0.0010 
(0.0240) 
0.0010 
(0.0200) 
-0.0020 
(0.0200) 
Reserves 
-0.0330** 
(0.0170) 
-0.0540 
(0.0230) 
-0.0500*** 
(0.0200) 
-0.0500** 
(0.0300) 
Short-term debt 
0.0700** 
(0.0300) 
0.0300 
(0.0700) 
0.0200 
(0.0600) 
0.0500 
(0.0600) 
US interest rate 
-0.0200 
(0.0400) 
0.1600*** 
(0.0122) 
0.0700* 
(0.0400) 
0.0700 
(0.0500) 
Observations 1144 574 884 757 
Countries 67 34 52 45 
Notes: Logistic regressions with fixed-effects. The White standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.  
5.1. Inequality and Zero Access to Credit 
Sovereign default occurs most likely when income inequality is at the 
intermediate level. This finding is a necessary piece of evidence to support my 
theory, but hardly a sufficient one. There might be other reasons why this non-
monotonic relationship exists in the data. One additional testable implication of 
the model regards the probability that a sovereign is denied access to credit. This 
outcome can be observed either because the sovereign opts not to send a costly 
signal or because the bank refuses to lend the sovereign that has requested a 
loan. In practice, there is no way to test each outcome separately because 
measuring who sent a costly signal and when it did is not obvious. However, it is 
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possible to predict and test the joint probability that a sovereign receives no 
credit for either reason. 
Figure 5 depicts the probability of zero access to credit as a function of the 
mean willingness to pay. This is just the sum of the two probabilities at the top 
panels in Figure 3. It shows that the probability of zero access to credit decreases 
monotonically with the mean willingness to pay. In other words, the greater the 
inequality of income, the more likely the sovereign has no access to credit. This 
explains why democracies with extreme income inequality are less likely to 
actually default than those with moderate income inequality. They appear more 
“risky”, and so they are “less often” given access to credit, hence, less likely to 
commit a default. 
     
Figure 5. The Probability of Zero Access to Credit 
I test this prediction on the probability of zero access to credit using data on 
the average interest rates charged by private lenders in a given year taken from 
GDF. The level of interest rate reflects a country’s default risk. As a country is 
perceived riskier, it will have to pay a higher interest rate to compensate investors 
for a greater likelihood of default. As noted earlier, however, when a country 
seems too risky, private lenders would find no level of interest rate that could 
offset the risks involved, and hence, a credit rationing would have a bite. In such a 
case, high risky countries would be left with no private credit, and their interest 
rates would not be observed. Then, a positive interest rate charged to a given 
country in a given year indicates that it did have access to private credit for that 
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year, and the lack thereof indicates otherwise, that is, it failed to have access to 
credit.16 The minimum observed interest rate is 5.05 and the maximum is 17.9 
while its mean is about 6.5 in the sample. The proportion of having an observed 
interest rate is 84.2 percent of the total 568 country-years in the sample. The 
remaining 15.8 percent (90 country-years) is rationed out of the private credit 
markets. 
Note that predicting yearly fluctuations of the incidence of zero credit access 
based on country risk profiles is not the most appropriate way to test the 
hypothesis. Rather, the primary task here is to show if the level of income 
inequality helps to predict long-run frequencies of countries’ credit accessibility. 
To capture this average behavior over the long run, I divide the sample period into 
seven non-overlapping five-year sub-periods and construct the dependent 
variable, Zero access, as the proportion of years of zero credit access in a given 
sub-period. It ranges from zero to one, with one indicating no access to credit all 
the time in a five-year period. To take the upper and lower censoring into 
account, I run tobit regressions. For a robustness check, however, I estimate two 
alternative model specifications as well. First, I take ten-year average measures 
over three ten-year sub-periods and run tobit regressions. Second, I take the 
entire sample period and run tobit regressions of cross-sections to see if greater 
income inequality is associated with more frequent zero access to credit on 
average. 
In estimating the effect of income inequality on zero credit access, I include a 
number of control variables. Democracy is included to control for the level of 
democracy; GDP per capita is for the level of economic development; log(GDP), 
the logarithm of GDP, is for the size of the economy; Trade is for the effect of 
trade dependency; and Total debt, the level of indebtedness, is for the effect of 
the amount of outstanding external debt. To account for the debt burden, I also 
include Interest payments, the ratio of interest payments to exports,; Short-term 
debt, the ratio of shortterm debt to total debt,; and Debt service, the ratio of total 
debt payments to exports. Concessional debt, the ratio of concessional debt to 
total debt, is also intended to capture its substitution effect on ordinary private 
credit. As a proxy for the variations of global liquidity, US interest rate is included. 
In addition, I added Default history, an indicator of whether a country has 
defaulted in the past five years. Finally, regional dummies are included. 
                                                          
16
 This corresponds to the first-stage selection-equation of a Heckman selection model of 
interest rates, in which the probability of having observations is first estimated, and then 
the level of interest rates is estimated taking into account the selection hazards. 
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The results of tobit regressions are reported in Table 3. Equality is significant 
and signed as expected across models. The results confirm the claim that the 
more equal a country’s income distribution is, the less often it experiences zero 
credit access. 
Table 3. Income inequality and zero access to credit 
 
(7) 
Five year 
(8) 
Ten year 
(9) 
All year 
Zero accesst-1 
0.5010*** 
(0.1940) 
0.1790 
(0.1500) 
- 
Democracy 
-0.0330 
(0.0490) 
-0.1200*** 
(0.0320) 
-0.0070 
(0.0070) 
Equality 
-0.0160** 
(0.0080) 
-0.0120** 
(0.0060) 
-0.0080** 
(0.0040) 
GDP per capita 
0.1000* 
(0.0400) 
0.1400*** 
(0.0300) 
0.3000 
(0.2000) 
Default History 
0.1160 
(0.1430) 
0.0800 
(0.1230) 
-0.1720 
(0.1080) 
Trade 
-0.0030 
(0.0030) 
-0.0030 
(0.0020) 
-0.0010 
(0.0010) 
Log GDP 
-0.2190*** 
(0.0630) 
-0.2630*** 
(0.0590) 
-0.0600** 
(0.0230) 
GDP growth 
0.0130 
(0.0190) 
-0.0020 
(0.0240) 
0.0110 
(0.0110) 
Export growth 
0.8350 
(0.6310) 
1.0040 
(1.1270) 
-0.8700 
(0.6410) 
Total debt 
0.0020 
(0.001) 
-0.3720 
(0.7090) 
0.3820 
(0.6120) 
Interest payments 
0.0040 
(0.0240) 
0.0450 
(0.0320) 
0.0350** 
(0.0160) 
Short-term debt 
0.0010 
(0.0050) 
-0.0010 
(0.0060) 
0.0030 
(0.0030) 
Debt service 
-0.2450 
(0.9290) 
-1.4950 
(1.3650) 
-2.2260*** 
(0.7090) 
Concessional debt 
0.0020 
(0.0040) 
0.0020 
(0.0030) 
0.0040* 
(0.0020) 
US interest rate 
-0.0960** 
(0.0390) 
-0.2350*** 
(0.0810) 
0.0800 
(0.3960) 
Constant 
5.6660*** 
(1.7620) 
9.1790*** 
(1.7870) 
2.0990 
(1.7730) 
Observations
 
130 48 60 
Countries 51 38 60 
Notes: Tobit regressions with random-effects. The White standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.  
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Substantively, its impact seems non-trivial. From the estimates of tobit 
regressions, one can infer that a 10-point increase in the Gini index leads to a 
substantial decrease in credit access, an 8 percent reduction at least (Model 9) to 
a 16 percent reduction at most (Model 7). This implies that countries with 
extreme income inequality (with a Gini index greater than 75) may find the 
opportunity to have private credit 16-32 percent less often than countries with 
the mean income inequality presumably because they are believed to be more 
likely to default. To the extent that they are as many times more likely to go 
without a loan, they have fewer chances to default.  
6. Conclusion 
Political economists have long argued that an increase in political 
participation and electoral competition in the context of extreme income 
inequality complicate matters of macroeconomic stability and imply various 
economic pathologies characterized by short-sighted, distortionary policies at the 
expense of long-term stability. Theoretically, sovereign default is one such 
pathology that is likely to result from the redistributive politics in democracies 
with a skewed income distribution. Empirical studies, however, have generally 
failed to demonstrate that income inequality is a key risk factor of sovereign 
default under democracy. The missing key is that if the theory is true, then one 
cannot observe its predicted patterns in data because creditors should also know 
that higher income inequality implies a greater risk and should act accordingly. 
Using a simple signaling game, I model how rational creditors and sovereigns 
interact strategically and show that if the theory is true, then empirically one 
should observe sovereign default most often when income inequality is not the 
greatest, but at the intermediate level. My model also shows that this is because 
countries with higher income inequality are more likely denied access to credit in 
the first place. I found consistent and robust support for the model’s predictions. 
Countries with a Gini index of above 65 are at least 8 percent more likely to lack 
access to credit and at least 17 percent less likely to actually default than those 
with a Gini index of around 55, which are, in turn, more likely to default, while less 
likely to have access to credit, than those with less inequality. In short, the 
empirical implications that the model generates are unique, and the empirical 
results that support the predictions are robust. My analysis suggests that income 
inequality is, in fact, a key factor in sovereign default risk. 
My analysis is not without limitation, however. Most of all, the global 
sovereign credit markets have undergone significant changes in the late 1990s. 
Most notably, commercial banks, once the predominant private creditors, now 
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gave way to fund managers, institutional investors, and individual creditors who 
are acting more or less without explicit coordination among them. In my model, a 
lending decision is assumed to be made as if it is made by one actor. This 
assumption is innocuous if commercial banks are the major creditors since they 
often organize themselves into a syndicate. For the new reality, this assumption 
may or may not be sustainable. Whether we entered a truly new world is an 
empirical question that can only be answered with new data. My findings, in this 
sense, need to stand the test of time.  
Nevertheless, my results have a couple of implications for our understanding 
of sovereign risk and global capital. First, since the 1980s, the problems of 
sovereign default have persisted, and this seems not to have been resolved 
despite the wave of democratization, but in part because of that. When the 
distribution of income is relatively equal so that the decisive median voter shares 
a stake in the longerrun health of the economy, democracy might help the 
government make credible commitments to honoring its contracts. As the income 
distribution becomes more skewed, however, democratic governments tend to be 
associated with more public vices than virtues. They might even become 
“inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, 
and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good” as Huntington 
(1991, p.10) might claim. This suggests the importance of active government’s 
role in addressing gross income inequality in many developing countries for their 
democracies to do more good than harm to their economies. 
Second, this study demonstrates that modeling strategic interaction can be 
crucial for some research questions in making correct predictions. Many 
outcomes of interest in international political economy are often an outcome of 
joint events, each of which involves strategic interactions between actors. 
Sovereign lending and default analyzed here is only one example. There are other 
cases to which essentially the same model can apply. For instance, foreign 
investors may decide to invest in a host country on observing that the country has 
signed a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with an important capital exporting 
country. Expecting this effect, a risky government might want to pay the 
sovereignty costs associated with signing such a treaty in the hopes that it will 
bring new foreign investments that it could then exploit. Anticipating this, on 
observing such a treaty, foreign investors might increase investments only when 
the host has a sufficiently good risk profile. Then, signing a BIT might not 
necessarily increase FDI inflows to the country. Rather, it might depend on the 
country’s observable characteristics from which investors infer its type. This might 
explain why empirical studies have produced mixed results as they failed to 
specify the interaction between a host country’s characteristics and whether it 
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has signed a BIT (e.g., Kerner, 2009). In this way, modeling strategic interaction 
can help us derive proper empirical implications that are otherwise elusive. 
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